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Abstract
This study examines and critiques rhetorical use of the term complicity by the Religious
Right in six U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1973 to 2021 as a tactic to restrict access to
reproductive care and exert control over female reproductive bodies. Comparing the language
invoked by Religious Right claimants and the Supreme Court justices to my working definition
of complicity reveals that use of complicity regarding reproductive care in the United States has
expanded in scope over time. However, the argument fails to meet four essential criteria
necessary for being considered complicit. Religious Right claimants generally base their
complicity arguments on a “slippery slope” fallacy and object to their perceived financial
facilitation of abortion and contraceptive medications through taxes and healthcare. The evidence
demonstrates that by drawing legal boundaries around the definition of complicity, the Supreme
Court would improve its ability to evaluate the legitimacy of religious-based complicity claims,
protect reproductive care access for third-party people with uteruses, and strike a better balance
between the increasingly conflicting rights to religious and reproductive freedom.

Key Terms: complicity; abortion; contraceptives; morality; law and society; U.S. law;
intersectionality; embodied subjectivity; Culture Wars; Religious Right; Contraceptive Mandate;
reproductive rights; Corporate Conscience; religious freedom
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Introduction: Reproductive Care’s Tenuous Intersectional Position in U.S. Law
In the 2020 U.S. presidential election, 68% of registered voters reported that healthcare is

a “very important” issue to their presidential vote; 40% said the same of abortion (Important
Issuesin the 2020 Election, 2020.) Although abortion had the lowest ranking in the survey, it
appeared alongside 10 other issues voters deemed “very important,” including the economy,
Supreme Court appointments, the 2020 coronavirus outbreak, violent crime, foreign policy, gun
policy, race and ethnic inequality, immigration, economic inequality, and climate change
(Important Issues in the 2020 Election, 2020.) If “the personal is political,” to quote the secondwave feminists of the 1960s and ‘70s, then reproductive care, and abortion specifically, is the
quintessential example, with serious consequences.
Reproductive health care’s tenuous position as both private and public makes it an issue
fraught with misconceptions. For instance, abortion is far more common than people realize.
According to a 2017 report by the Guttmacher Institute, nearly one in four women in the United
States will have had an abortion by the time they are 45 years old, and at 34%, women aged 2024 account for the largest number of abortions (Abortion is a Common Experience for U.S.
Women, Despite Dramatic Declines in Rates, 2017). This means that we very likely have
someone in our lives who has had an abortion; I personally know of at least two. I remember
being surprised when, after a night of drinking, a close friend of mine confided to me that she
had undergone an abortion three years before, during her freshman year of college, after an
unintended pregnancy with her longtime boyfriend. She explained that she kept it a secret
because she was worried that people might perceive her differently and shame her for her
choices; that I, her friend of ten years, would castigate her. I remember telling her that I did not
think any less of her, and that she should be proud of herself for making a decision that felt right
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to her. Knowing what I know now, I wonder how many others there are in my life, people whomI
love, who treat their abortions as skeletons in the dark, reluctant to let them out for fear of the
social stigma. As a woman living in the United States, that person could very easily be me.
Another misconception regarding reproductive care are the reasons why individuals take
contraceptive medications. According to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), from 20152017, 64.9% of women aged 15-49 in the U.S. were currently using a method of contraception
(Daniels & Abma, 2018). In a 2011 report on the use of oral contraceptive pills, the Guttmacher
Institute found that 86% of women use the pill for pregnancy prevention, but they also found that
many women use the pill for non-contraceptive reasons (Many American Women Use Birth
Control Pills for Noncontraceptive Reasons, 2011). They found that 31% of women use the pill
for menstrual regulation; 28% of women used the pill for the “side effects” of menstruation (such
as migraines and cramps); 14% of women use the pill to treat acne; and 4% of women use the
pill to treat endometriosis. An individual person might use the pill for multiple reasons, but the
study found that only 42% of women use the pill exclusively for pregnancy prevention. Other
hormonal contraceptive methods such as the ring, patch, implant, and intrauterine device (IUD)
offer similar benefits. From these statistics, it is clear that birth control is an essential form of
healthcare for people with uteruses not only for sexual intimacy, but for their individual mental,
emotional, and physical well-being.
Because abortion and contraception occupy the intersection between private and public
spheres, this also means they rest at the intersection of the constitutionally protected rights to
religious exercise and reproductive freedom. The U.S. constitution’s simultaneous promises of
separation between church and state and freedom to exercise religion, coupled with reproductive
care’s intersectional position, has made abortion and contraceptives particularly susceptible to
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legal and legislative attacks. The Hyde Amendment, passed in 1976, blocks federal funds from
being used for abortions, with the exception being in cases of rape, incest, or a threat to the
pregnant woman’s life. Under the facade of protecting women’s health, Targeted Restrictions of
Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws impose medically unnecessary requirements on abortion
facilities with the goal of shutting them down. In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby in 2014, the Supreme
Court gave for-profit corporations the right to religious exemption from the Affordable Care
Act’s federally mandated abortion and contraceptive coverage because to comply would conflict
with the company owner’s “sincerely held” religious beliefs and make them complicit in
immoral conduct. In 2019, 25 abortion bans and 58 abortion restrictions were enacted, mostly in
states in the South and Midwestern U.S. Restrictions ranged from gestational age bans, bans on
specific abortion methods, bans on patient reasoning, to “trigger bans” in the event that Roe v.
Wade is overturned (Access to Contraception, 2017). Through a combination of legislation and
court rulings, the Religious Right has been largely successful in limiting abortion and
contraceptive access to U.S. individuals with uteruses.
Looking at the U.S.’s legal and legislative history, it is clear that as the private matter of
reproductive care becomes increasingly public and subject to religious scrutiny, so too do
women’s bodies become increasingly controlled by the state, thereby denying them full
reproductive agency and autonomy. In 2017, nearly 49% of pregnancies were unintended, and
were especially common among low-income women and women of color. Despite Roe v. Wade’s
legalization of abortion in 1973, high out of pocket costs, deductibles, copayments, legislation
like the Hyde Amendment, and legal rulings such as Hobby Lobby have prevented individuals
with uteruses from fully exercising their right to reproductive freedom, particularly low-income
women who are more likely to be uninsured. Even if contraception is covered, women still pay
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approximately 60% of the out-of-pocket cost compared with the typical out-of-pocket cost of
only 33% for non-contraceptive medications. Furthermore, at the same time that Catholics are
one of the most vocal groups opposed to abortion and contraceptives, 10 out of 25 of the largest
U.S. health systems are Catholic-sponsored facilities (Access to Contraception, 2017). Given
both Hobby Lobby’s ruling and the tradition of legal precedence, there exists a strong potential
for this ruling to expand and allow physicians, nurses, and even pharmacists to deny individuals
reproductive care on religious grounds. Can you imagine the outrage if health insurance coverage
of medications like Viagra were suddenly unavailable to individuals with penises due to the
religious preferences of their employer or healthcare provider? Better yet, as I am writing in the
moment of the COVID-19 pandemic, what if the religious convictions held by employers’ or
healthcare providers denied individuals access to the COVID-19 vaccine, a vaccine that is
essential for ending a public health emergency?

II. Statement of the Problem: Religious Right and Legal Understandings of Complicity
Much research has been conducted examining legislation and legal rulings as locations
for the Religious Right to subvert the right to reproductive care that was established by Roe v.
Wade in 1973. Extensive research has also been published arguing why Religious Right claims
against abortion and contraceptives in the legal sphere are morally and scientifically incorrect,
with a special focus on how these claims undermine reproductive care access and are harmful to
people with uteruses. Indeed, as I have already illustrated, the effects of reproductive care
restrictions are immense. However, while academic work has devoted significant effort to
refuting Religious Right claims against abortion and contraceptives by focusing on the
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implications, and rightfully so, little scholarly work has been devoted to understanding the logic
of Religious Right claims against these activities, and why they have been successful in U.S law.
Few scholars recognize that a central component to Religious Right claims against
abortion and contraceptives in the courtroom is not a blatant disregard for people with uteruses’
reproductive agency and autonomy. Rather, it is the notion that their own actions (or inactions)
have influence in reproductive care outcomes, and as such, their actions (or inactions) are also
capable of making them complicit, or even potentially complicit, in conduct they believe to be
morally abhorrent. Their initial, individual action might be innocent in and of itself, but can and
does lead others to perform subsequent acts that end in the destruction of a fetus, an act that is
inherently and immoral. It is under this framing that Religious Right legal claims against
abortion and contraceptives have been institutionalized and continue to operate in the U.S.
Many scholars have started to investigate the complicity claim, particularly as it pertains
to Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), in which the complicity claim was made very explicitly.
Many seek to answer questions such as: What does complicity look like? How do we measure it?
Is complicity based on our proximity to a specific action being taken? Is it based on our
relationship to the individual taking that action? While few researchers strive to answer these
questions, even fewer recognize that the complicity claim is not isolated to Hobby Lobby; in fact,
the complicity claim is an identifiable trend in Religious Right legal arguments against abortion
and contraceptives that has existed since Roe v. Wade (1973). While academic work has
extensively examined the political and legal implications of Religious Right complicity logic,
little work seeks to combat the complicity logic itself, whether it be amongst individuals or
within U.S. legal institutions. Because of this neglect, research meant to encourage Religious
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Right anti-choice advocates to join the pro-choice movement falls on deaf ears, sometimes even
exacerbating the culture war divide.
This project answers the questions: How have Religious Right anti-choice claimants’
rhetoric of complicity evolved and expanded under U.S. Supreme Court rulings since Roe v.
Wade in 1973, and is their rhetorical use of complicity legitimate? To answer this question, this
study analyzes rhetorical trends in six U.S. Supreme Court cases from 1973 to 2020 in which
Religious Right claimants use the complicity argument as a legal tactic to restrict abortion and
contraceptive access. By applying feminist theories of state control of the body and
intersectionality with multi-disciplinary legal and philosophical interpretations, I use my own
working definition of complicity to argue that Religious Right complicity claims regarding
reproductive care have expanded in ways that are not only harmful to people with uteruses, but
also that are flawed and illegitimate. This case study lays the groundwork for how legal
boundaries around the definition of complicity might be constructed as a potential solution for
the Supreme Court to better assess Religious Right complicity claims and balance religious and
reproductive freedoms without one undermining the other.

III. Literature Review: Legal Philosophies
It is clear that as American society has evolved, so, too, has American citizens’
relationshipwith the law. In her book Invitation to Law and Society: An Introduction to the Study
of Real Law, scholar Kitty Calavita discusses the varying ways in which the law shapes society.
She reveals that whether individuals realize it or not, the law shapes the way individuals live by
creating conceptual boundaries and determining the content of those boundaries (Calavita, 2010).
Kimberlé Crenshaw’s critical race theory and theory of intersectionality are introduced to
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demonstrate not only how social categories like race and gender are socially constructed, but also
how these categories are often disempowered by the law because they tend to be viewed as
mutually exclusive (Calavita, 2010). The law is not as fair, neutral, or just as it may outwardly
appear. American law contains gaps that lead to non-enforcement, selective enforcement, and
different interpretations of the statutes, and as a result the law in practice impacts individuals
differently based on their social positionality (Calavita, 2010).
One of the most significant ways that American society’s relationship with the law has
changed is due to the power of Christian religion on legislation. Despite the American
Constitution’s provision of the separation between church and state, Christian religion has
become increasingly present, and even dominant, in the law, which has a particularly harmful
and discriminatory impact on non-Christians, women, and the LGBTQ+ community. In A Brief,
Liberal, Catholic Defense of Abortion, Dombrowski and Deltete (2000) outline the roots of many
religious claimants’ opposition to abortion and “abortifacients,” which includes the aspect of
natural law that sex should only occur in monogamous marriage for a solely procreative purpose,
as well as the perception of a fetus as a potential human person, and that having a human body
provides enough evidence of a fetus having a human soul (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000). Other
Religious Right anti-choice claims are based on the belief that life begins at the moment of
conception, or that contraceptives prevent the fertilization of an ovum that would otherwise
become human life (Corrado Del Bo, 2012, pp. 133-145).
Since the Supreme Court’s decision to protect women’s right to privacy in the 1973 case
Roe v. Wade, the Religious Right has used popular culture, state legislatures, Congress, and the
courts to exert influence and effectively undermine sexuality policy (Joffe, 2007). Using the
rhetoric of war, emergency, or catastrophe, the Religious Right has started a “Culture War''
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between the constitutionally protected rights to freedom of religion and freedom to reproductive
care (Ben-Asher, 2018). By encouraging the passage of parental-consent laws, TRAP laws, and
cultural stigmatization of abortion, Religious Right efforts have been largely successful (Joffe,
2007). The courts especially have been a major location of triumph for the Religious Right
against abortion rights, as cases like Harris v. McRae (1980), Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services (1983), Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), and
Gonzalez v. Carhart (2003) have upheld abortion restrictions such as preventing their federal
funding and banning “partial birth abortions” (Joffe, 2007, p. 72).
Most recently, the Supreme Court case Burwell v. Hobby Lobby in 2014 marks a
revolutionary strengthening of the historical trends of Religious Right claims against
reproductive rights. Under the Affordable Care Act (ACA), employers are required to uphold the
“Contraceptive Mandate” and provide employees with insurance coverage for abortion and
contraceptive healthcare. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the law on which the
Hobby Lobby decision was based, was enacted in 1993 to protect the first amendment rights of
religious minorities in the aftermath of Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
of Oregon v. Smith (1990), and it was enabled under the ACA in 2010 to allow non-profit
employers to exempt themselves from the Contraceptive Mandate on religious grounds (BenAsher, 2018). Although accommodations have historically existed in private spaces in the U.S.,
until recently, religious exemptions were largely uncommon, and Hobby Lobby became the first
case in which a public, commercial entity could do so (Sepper, 2016, p. 652). In the Hobby
Lobby case, the Supreme Court decided that the RFRA applied to not only non-profit
organizations, but for-profit companies as well because they are a collective of individuals with
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their own moral and religious beliefs who should not have to be complicit in an act that they find
morally objectionable.
In essence, the Supreme Court gave the Hobby Lobby corporation permission to
discriminate against thousands of its employees, regardless of their religious beliefs, who may
become pregnant from receiving abortion and contraceptive coverage. This third-party harm was
left largely unconsidered by the Court (Sepinwall, 2015). In a legal system that follows legal
precedent, the doctrine of “corporate conscience” has dangerous implications for people with
uteruses as more individuals have sought religious exemptions from providing abortion and
contraceptive care, including pharmacists, doctors, and other healthcare workers (Sepper, 2015).
These implications extend beyond abortion and contraceptives toward medical procedures such
as end-of-life care. In her dissent in Hobby Lobby (2014), Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, joined
by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, explains that women’s participation in the economic sphere depends
on their ability to control their reproductive lives. Furthermore, women pay much more than men
for preventative care, and cost is capable of blocking women from receiving any preventative
care at all. As such, providing religious exemptions would deny coverage to women who do not
share their employer’s religious beliefs. In her conclusion, she quotes an opinion made by the
Lee Court, “‘When followers of a particular sect enter into commercial activity as a matter of
choice . . . the limits they accept on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not
to be superimposed on statutory schemes which are binding on others in that activity’” (Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014, sec. IV).
The increasing scope of how religious claimants define complicity begs the question, how
has their philosophical definition of complicity in abortion and contraceptive services evolved
and expanded under U.S. Supreme Court rulings since Roe v. Wade in 1973? Where is the

Rahn, “Funding Abortion as Facilitating It”
June 11, 2021

15

boundary between complicity and responsibility? Should the Court draw legal boundaries around
the definition of complicity, and if so, how should it be measured? According to Nejaime and
Siegel (2015), there are two dimensions to complicity-based conscience claims; the third party’s
conduct, and the claimant’s relationship to the third party (p. 2518). Sepinwall (2015) goes even
further, and argues that complicity can be determined based on moral claims, empirical claims,
and relational claims (p. 1912). She points out that complicity is not as simple as a claimant’s
proximity to the act in question, because often the claimant has no choice in what actions the
third party does or does not take, and measuring by proximity denies moral responsibility for
actions one does not directly participate in (Sepinwall, 2015). Furthermore, it is clear that in
contrast to the law, religious claimants believe that a “relatively weak” relationship to the act in
question is enough to implicate them (Sepinwall, 2015, p. 1935). At the same time, courts must
weigh religious claims against government and third-party interests, and there must be empirical
standards for courts to determine their validity (Sepinwall, 2015, p. 1929, 1933).
This study adds to the body of research done on Religious Right anti-choice complicity
claims by comparing the language invoked by Religious Right claimants and Supreme Court
justices with qualitative analysis of how these claimants perceive their complicity to the
abortion/contraceptive act they are objecting to. It examines how the increasing scope of
complicity affects people with uteruses’ access to abortion and contraceptive services, how direct
the lines of complicity are, and whether legal boundaries must be established around
complicity’s definition in order to ensure more fair and consistent legal decision-making. This
study argues that Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims are invalid and harmful to people
with uteruses, and as such, boundaries around complicity are necessary for the Court to better
assess their legitimacy. By developing my own working definition of complicity, this study
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demonstrates why Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims are invalid, how they negatively
impact people with uteruses, and that definitional boundaries around complicity are a potential
solution for the U.S. legal system to strike a better balance between protecting religious and
reproductive freedoms.

IV. Research Design: Defining “Complicit”
My research study follows an interpretive case research design in order to conduct a
qualitative study of how Religious Right anti-choice claimants understand complicity regarding
reproductive care, how they employ complicity rhetoric in the U.S. Supreme Court setting as a
tactic to restrict reproductive care, and why their complicity rhetoric fails. To study this, my unit
of analysis comes from six U.S. Supreme Court cases specifically dealing with abortion,
contraceptives, and questions of complicity between 1973 (when Roe v. Wade was decided) and
the present (2021). To select the cases for analysis, I started with the cases that appeared most
frequently in academic work on this topic, then narrowed it down to the cases whose legal issue
in question best fit my definition of complicity. For the purposes of this research, my definition
of complicity draws from the Oxford English Dictionary, Black’s Law Dictionary, U.S. criminal
law, and previous scholarship to provide a more philosophically and legally comprehensive
definition. The definitions of complicity from these sources are as follows: According to the
Oxford English Dictionary, complicity is “The being an accomplice; partnership in an evil
action” (Complicity, n.). Black’s Law Dictionary (Garner, 2019) is more precise. In Black’s,
“complicity” means “1) Involvement in a crime together with other people; association or
participation in a criminal act as an accomplice. Under the Model Penal Code, a person can be an
accomplice as a result of either that person’s own conduct or the conduct of another (such as an
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innocent agent) for which that person is legally accountable” or “2) Involvement in or knowledge
of a situation that is morally wrong or entails dishonesty.” According to U.S. criminal law, such
as that of the Washington State Legislature:
1) A person is guilty of a crime if it is committed by the conduct of another person for
which he or she is legally accountable.
2) A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when:
a) Acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the
crime, he or she causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such
conduct; or
b) He or she is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or
by the law defining the crime; or
c) He or she is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the crime.
3) A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of a crime if:
a) With knowledge that it will promote or facilitate the commission of the crime, he
or she:
i) Solicits, commands, encourages, or requests such other person to commit it; or
ii) Aids or agrees to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or
b) His or her conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his or her complicity.
4) A person who is legally incapable of committing a particular crime himself or herself
may be guilty thereof if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which he
or she is legally accountable, unless such liability is inconsistent with the purpose of
the provision establishing his or her incapacity.
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5) Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law defining the crime, a person isnot
an accomplice in a crime committed by another person if:
a) He or she is a victim of that crime; or
b) He or she terminates his or her complicity prior to the commission of the crime,
and either gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise
makes a good faith effort to prevent the commission of the crime.
6) A person legally accountable for the conduct of another person may be convicted on
proof of the commission of the crime and of his or her complicity therein, though the
person claimed to have committed the crime has not been prosecuted or convicted or
has been convicted of a different crime or degree of crime or has an immunity to
prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted (Liability for Conduct of Another—
Complicity.)
The verbiage of these definitions of complicity make it clear that it is very active concept,
not passive, using verbs like promote, facilitate, solicit, command, encourage, and request.
Complicity also has an inherently negative connotation, as these definitions contain language like
crime, dishonesty, culpability, accomplice, and wrong. Additionally, these definitions
demonstrate that complicity has a close relationship to responsibility, which the Oxford English
Dictionary defines as “The state or fact of being accountable; liability, accountability for
something” (Complicity, n.). As such, how do we differentiate between when we are responsible
and when we are complicit?
From these sources and their definitions of complicity, I developed my own working
definition in an attempt to capture complicity’s simultaneous legal specificity and moral
ambiguity. For the purposes of this research project, while responsibility describes an individual
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as being the primary if not the only agent in an act of wrongdoing, complicity describes degrees
of agency one has in an act of wrongdoing, and specifically an act of wrongdoing done by
another person. The more agency one has in the act, the more complicit they are. One is not
complicit legally if they are a victim of the evil act, if one ends their involvement before the evil
act is committed, or if one has no way of knowing/reasonable suspicion that another person is
performing an evil act. The act can be positive or negative, done intentionally or unintentionally,
and with awareness or unawareness of the consequences. Complicity and responsibility both
mean being accountable for others’ well-being, but they also mean being accountable for others’
suffering. One can also be collectively responsible and/or collectively complicit with others for
something. For instance, no one is singularly responsible for climate change, but individuals are
collectively complicit in climate change because everyone emits varying amounts of greenhouse
gases. These individuals are collectively responsible for each others’ health and the well-being of
the planet. Individuals do not necessarily have agency over each others’ carbon emissions (and
therefore cannot be responsible for them), but they do have agency over their own carbon
emissions, and therefore a responsibility to lower them for the collective good.
Based on this definition of complicity, I selected six U.S. Supreme Court cases, which
includes Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae (1980), Williams v. Zbaraz (1980), Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), and
Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania (2020).
I use these six cases to examine how Religious Right anti-choice claimants’ understand
their own complicity in abortion and contraceptive care and how the scope of their self-assumed
complicity has broadened under Supreme Court rulings from 1973 to the present. Through this
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analysis, I assert that their claims to complicity are not only harmful to people with uteruses’
right to reproductive choice, but also that these complicity claims are flawed and illegitimate.
Beal v. Doe is a 1977 case in which anti-choice advocates sought to uphold a
Pennsylvania law that prevented Medicaid funds from going toward nontherapeutic abortions
except for in situations where an abortion was medically necessary (Beal v. Doe, 1977).
Examining Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Supreme Court upheld the
Pennsylvania lawand ruled that “nothing in the statute suggests that participating States are
required to fund every medical procedure that falls within the delineated categories of medical
care” (Beal v. Doe,1977). Thus began the first of a chain of cases in which the Court ruled that
while people with uteruses have reproductive rights, the state is not required to provide finances
that allow them to exercise those rights.
Harris v. McRae is a 1980 case in which appellees from New York contested that similar
to the Pennsylvania law in Beal v. Doe (1977), the Hyde Amendment that was enacted in 1976
was unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment (Harris v. McRae, 1980). The
appellees claimed that that the state has a duty under Title XIX to provide Medicaid funding for
abortions, a duty that the Hyde Amendment does not relieve. The central question in this case
was, does “Title XIX require a State that participates in the Medicaid program to fund the cost of
medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde
Amendment” (Harris v. McRae, 1980)? In its analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that Roe v.
Wade “did not translate into a constitutional obligation of [the state] to subsidize abortion,” and
the Hyde Amendment “does not permit federal reimbursement of all medically necessary
abortions” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). The Court also declared that the Hyde Amendment does not
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violate the separation of church and state because it serves a secular legislative purpose” (Harris
v. McRae, 1980). The Court asserted that “the Hyde Amendment, by encouraging childbirth
except in the most urgent circumstances, is rationally related to the legitimate governmental
objective of protecting potential life” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). As such, the Hyde Amendment is
constitutional, and like Beal v. Doe, although individuals with uteruses have a right to an
abortion, the state is not obligated to pay for them.
Williams v. Zbaraz is another 1980 case related to Harris v. McRae (1980) (Williams v.
Zbaraz, 1980). This case concerned an Illinois statute that prohibited government financial
assistance toward abortion procedures except in cases where the abortion is necessary to save the
woman’s life. The District Court ruled that the Hyde Amendment, which prohibits the use of
federal funds for abortions, does not relieve the state of its responsibility under Title XIX of the
Social Security Act to fund medically necessary abortions regardless of the threat to the woman’s
life. The District Court ruled that the Illinois statute and the Hyde Amendment violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the District Court lacked jurisdiction
to judge the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment. The central issue in this case, then, was if
the District Court had the authority to consider the Hyde Amendment, and if the Hyde
Amendment allows a state to restrict funding of abortions that it is obligated to fund by Title
XIX. Here, the Supreme Court ruled that although the District Court claimed that the same
analysis for the Illinois statute would apply to the Hyde Amendment and make both
unconstitutional, it should not have considered the Hyde Amendment because it was outside of
its jurisdiction. At the same time, using Harris v. McRae (1980) as precedent, the Supreme Court
proclaimed that a state is not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions, and a statute like
Illinois’s or the Hyde Amendment does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth
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Amendment. By extension, then, the Hyde Amendment also does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and is constitutional. Based on this reasoning,
the Hyde Amendment has remained constitutional to this day.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey is a 1992 case regarding the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, which required a woman seeking an abortion to
give informed consent, a 24-hour waiting period between consent and the abortion procedure, as
well as sign a statement claiming that she has informed her husband, or a parent if the seeker is a
minor (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 1992). These requirements
were exempted in the case of an emergency. The law also contained reporting requirements for
facilities that provide abortions. The petitioners in this case were five abortion facilities, an
individual physician, and a class of physicians who charge that all of the provisions of the act
were unconstitutional and would overturn Roe v. Wade (1973). In the Supreme Court’s analysis,
the justices made sweeping claims about who is involved in abortion decisions. The Court
concluded the case by replacing the trimester framework established by Roe v. Wade (1973),
which outlined at which stages of pregnancy abortions were legal, with the undue burden
standard for whether or not a law was an impediment to an individual’s ability to exercise their
reproductive rights. In regard to the Pennsylvania law, the Court ruled that the informed consent
requirement, the 24-hour waiting period, and the spousal notification requirement, or parental
notification if the abortion-seeker was a minor, imposed no undue burden on women’s ability to
access an abortion. As such, the Pennsylvania statute was constitutional, and it opened the door
for who has a say in people with uteruses’ reproductive decisions.
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, the 2014 case that has already been mentioned several times in
this project, concerned the Green family who own and operate Hobby Lobby stores nation-wide
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according to their Christian faith, including their belief that contraceptives are immoral (Burwell
v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 2014). One of the sons in the Green family also runs an affiliated
Christian bookstore company called Mardel. The Green family’s case was joined with a case
brought by the Hahn family, who run a for-profit business called Conestoga and are members of
the Mennonite Church, a Christian denomination, and run their business according to their
religious principles, which includes that life begins at conception. Both families of all three
companies believe that facilitating access to contraceptive drugs and devices violates their
religion. In September 2012, the Green family sued Kathleen Sebelius of the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to contest the requirement that their healthcare plans
for employees cover contraceptives as federally mandated by the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA). Looking at the RFRA, which prohibits the government from
“substantially burdening” a person’s religious exercise unless it is for a “compelling
governmental interest” and is done in the “least restrictive means,” the central question was
whether or not RFRA, which traditionally only applied to non-profit companies, could apply to
for-profit companies. In its analysis, the Supreme Court turned to the Dictionary Act, which
states that the word person includes “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals” (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 2014). The Supreme Court ruled that since for-profit companies are made up of individuals
with their own “sincerely held” religious beliefs and the contraceptive mandate only serves a
broad government interest of “public health” and “gender equality” rather than a “compelling”
interest, the contraceptive mandate violates the RFRA (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,
2014). The Court then declared that the RFRA does apply to for-profit companies, meaning for-
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profit companies can be exempted from the Contraceptive Mandate and deny contraceptive
healthcare coverage to their employees on religious grounds.
Finally, Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania is the most recent case, brought to the
Supreme Court in 2020 by Little Sisters of the Poor, a Roman Catholic organization that runs
religious nonprofits (Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
2020). Similar to Hobby Lobby, Little Sisters of the Poor claimed that complying with the
Contraceptive Mandate of the ACA and completing the self-certification form of the RFRA
would “force them to violate their religious beliefs by ‘tak[ing] actions that directly cause others
to provide contraception or appear to participate in the Departments’ delivery scheme” (Little
Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 2020). The organization was
opposed to four specific methods of contraception covered by the Contraceptive Mandate that
they believed “risked causing the death of a human embryo,” and if they were to provide them,
they would be made complicit in abortion (Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home
v. Pennsylvania, 2020). In this case, the central issue was if the federal government had lawfully
allowed for religious objectors to be exempted from the contraceptive mandate of the ACA.
Again turning to the RFRA, the Supreme Court majority opinion ruled that because the language
of the RFRA never mentions contraceptives, Congress failed to protect contraceptive coverage.
This means that the Contraceptive Mandate is capable of violating the RFRA, and the
Departments had the authority to exempt Little Sisters of the Poor from the Contraceptive
Mandate.
To summarize these cases, Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae (1980) and Williams v.
Zbaraz (1980) are a chain of three cases in which the Supreme Court ruled that while people
with uteruses have reproductive rights, as ruled in Roe v. Wade (1973), neither the state nor the
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federal government are obligated to pay for them. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), the Court ruled that a 1982 Pennsylvania abortion law was
constitutional because they claimed it posed no undue burden on abortion access, and it widened
the scope of who has a say in people with uteruses’ reproductive decisions. Finally, Burwell v
Hobby Lobby (2014) and Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania (2020) are two cases in which
the Court declared that religious objectors have a right to be exempted from the Contraceptive
Mandate based on the employers’ religious beliefs, regardless of whether they are a for-profit
company or a nonprofit organization.
The language in these cases fit my definition of complicity by evoking closely related
terms such as obligation, immoral, sinful, violate, implicate, facilitate, consequence, authority,
participate, permission, “sincere belief,” and the term complicit itself, all of which suggest a
negative perception of abortion and contraceptives and the existence of an influential relationship
between the religious petitioner and the respondent. This is an ideal sample because not only are
these six cases accessibly located in the public domain, but because of federal supremacy, the
interpretations of complicity made by the Supreme Court and religious claimants are highly
generalizable to the U.S. population and U.S. law at the local, state, and federal levels.
Additionally, because the cases are spread across the 47-year period between 1973 and the
present, and because of the U.S. tradition of legal precedence, they adequately represent the
long-lasting legal changes in the understanding of complicity by religious claimants and U.S.
judges over time. This sample is also valid and reliable, as extensive research has been
conducted on the relationship between religion and reproductive rights using these same casesand
arriving at the conclusion that religion tends to undermine reproductive rights. That beingsaid,
this research is somewhat limited because only six cases out of the 46 abortion and contraceptive
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cases available in the public domain, but the principle of legal precedence accommodates for this
limitation as each case draws on the rules established by those before thatdealt with similar legal
questions.
By analyzing the language used by Religious Right anti-choice complicity claimants in
the Supreme Court setting, my research adopts the interpretive method to develop a theory about
how Religious Right anti-choice claimants’ define and perceive their own complicity, and how
their perception of complicity has expanded under legal rulings over time. In doing so, I dissect
these Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims to demonstrate the fallacies on which they
rest and the negative consequences they have on people with uteruses.

V.

Findings

Complicity as Financial Facilitation
All of the cases dealing with complicity raise questions regarding state and federal
programs and employer responsibilities. Within this context, it is no surprise that in one way or
another, allof the cases convey the perception of complicity in abortion and contraceptive
services as being mainly centered around some sort of financial facilitation. Beginning with Beal
v. Doe (1977), inwhich the central question is if “Title XIX requires Pennsylvania to fund under
its Medicaid program the cost of all abortions that are permissible under state law,” the question
itself suggests that state funding for abortions might make the state complicit in an act it finds
morallyreprehensible (Beal v. Doe, 1977). In this case, the Supreme Court consistently repeated
that the state has an “important and legitimate interest” in protecting human life, and as such,
“nothing in the [Title XIX] suggests that participating States are required to fund every medical
procedurethat falls within the delineated categories of medical care” (Beal v. Doe, 1977). The
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Court concluded that a state may provide funds for abortions if it so chooses, but it is not
required to. This not only suggests that abortions are an immoral act, but it also gives the state
the ability to make its own conscientious decisions regarding what is moral or immoral, and
whether or not tomake itself complicit in certain acts by means of financial facilitation.
Harris v. McRae (1980) and Williams v. Zbaraz (1980) take the implication of state
complicity from Beal v. Doe (1977) one step further, and suggest that through federal funding of
abortion and contraceptive services, taxpayers may even be considered complicit. In the
Supreme Court case Harris v. McRae (1980), the central issue was if “Title XIX require[s] a
State that participates in the Medicaid program to fund the cost of medically necessary abortions
for which federal reimbursement is unavailable under the Hyde Amendment” (Harris v. McRae,
1980) Similarly, in Williams v. Zbaraz (1980), the Court considered the question if “the District
Court ha[d] the authority to consider the Hyde Amendment, and does the Hyde Amendment
allow a state to restrict funding of abortions that it is obligated to fund by Title XIX” (Williams v.
Zbaraz, 1980)?
The Hyde Amendment is a U.S. policy still in place today that was enacted in 1976 to
“[p]rohibi[t] the use of federal funds for any health benefits coverage that includes abortion,”
except in cases of rape, incest, or if the pregnancy threatens the life of the woman (pregnant
person) (Casey, 2013). Any healthcare plans receiving federal funds must keep those funds
separate from funds for abortion services (Casey, 2013). The law itself implies that not only
might the state be complicit if it appoints funding toward abortions, but that the taxpayers who
supply the finances for that funding would also be complicit.
In Harris v. McRae (1980), the appellees claimed that “the effect of the Hyde
Amendment is to withhold federal reimbursement for certain medically necessary abortions, but
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not to relieve a participating State of its duty under Title XIX to provide for such abortions in its
Medicaid plan” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). This demonstrates a fundamental difference in how
abortion is perceived. Whereas the appellees viewed abortion as a “duty” and “responsibility” for
the state to provide, the state of Pennsylvania viewed it as an “evil” act in which providing
Medicaid funding would make it complicit. As such, the Court ruled that because
the Congress that enacted Title XIX did not intend a participating State to assume a
unilateral funding obligation for any health service in an approved Medicaid plan, it
follows that Title XIX does not require a participating State to include in its plan any
services for which a subsequent Congress has withheld federal funding (Harris v. McRae,
1980).
Instead, as the Court claimed, the Hyde Amendment “places no governmental obstacle in the
path of a woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy, but rather, by means of unequal
subsidization of abortion and other medical services, encourages alternative activity deemed in
the public interest” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). Thus, “by encouraging childbirth except in the
most urgent circumstances, [the Hyde Amendment] is rationally related to the legitimate
governmental objective of protecting potential life” (Harris v. McRae, 1980). This reasoning was
used as precedent to reach the same conclusion in Williams v. Zbaraz (1980). The rulings of both
of these cases demonstrate that “encouraging childbirth” is the preferential, moral alternative to
abortion, and that to direct federal funding toward such an “evil” act would make both the state
and its lawful, taxpaying citizens complicit in immorality. By preventing federal funding from
going toward abortion and specific contraceptive services, the state and taxpayers can prevent an
evil act from occurring and avoid assuming guilt if it does.

Rahn, “Funding Abortion as Facilitating It”
June 11, 2021

29

Complicity as Financial Facilitation: Healthcare
If Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae (1980), and Williams v. Zbaraz (1980)
established that financial facilitation is grounds for complicity, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014)
and Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) expanded that rhetoric to include healthcare coverage as a
form of financial facilitation. In Hobby Lobby (2014), the Hahn family who own Conestoga
Wood Specialties argued that because they believe that life begins at conception, it is “‘against
[their] moral conviction to be involved in the termination of human life’ after conception, which
they believe is a ‘sin against God to which they are held accountable’” (Hobby Lobby, 2014).
Due to this assumption of complicity, the Hahns “accordingly excluded from the group-healthinsurance plan they offer to their employees certain contraceptive methods that they consider to
be abortifacients” (Hobby Lobby, 2014). This notion of complicity as financial facilitation
through healthcare becomes even more explicit throughout the case, as the Hahns claimed that
“‘it is immoral and sinful for [them] to intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or
otherwise support these drugs’” (Hobby Lobby, 2014). Similarly, the Green family who own
Hobby Lobby also believed “that life begins at conception and that it would violate their religion
to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point” (Hobby Lobby,
2014).
Hobby Lobby’s (2014) understanding of healthcare coverage as facilitation of abortions
and therefore complicity in them was used as precedent in Little Sisters of the Poor (2020), in
which the religious organization claimed complicity on two grounds, with the first being “to the
requirement that they maintain and pay for a plan under which coverage for contraceptives
would be provided,” and the second being “to submission of the self-certification form required
by the accommodation because without that certification their plan could not be used to provide
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contraceptive coverage” Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania,
2020). For the Hahns, the Greens, and Little Sisters of the Poor, their opposition to the
Contraceptive Mandate suggests their belief that to comply would not only be permitting and
making it possible for abortions to occur (specifically among their employees), but that they are
actively causing those abortions be performed. Without healthcare coverage of abortions and
“abortifacients,” the “termination of human life” cannot take place. While Beal v. Doe (1977),
Harris v. McRae (1980), and Williams v. Zbaraz (1980) planted the seeds for what complicity
could look like, Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014) and Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) broadened
the term and made it explicit.
The Supreme Court rulings in Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae (1980), Williams v.
Zbaraz (1980), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), and Little Sisters of the Poor v. Pennsylvania
(2020) suggest the existence of a relationship between money and property as a basis for
complicity. According to the classical liberal thinker John Locke, whose philosophy
predominates U.S. political thought, what we put our labor into becomes our property (Locke,
2003, p. 191). What these five cases imply is that if the federal government, states, or taxpayers
put their labor or money into the abortion and contraceptive services, whether it be direct funding
or healthcare coverage, their financial property is permitting and in fact being used for an act
they perceive as immoral. By extension, then, the “immoral” act of abortion and contraceptive
services is their property, an act in which they must assume responsibility and they are complicit
in because it is their money. Although money leaves their hands, and although they do not know
whether or not those funds toward abortions are being used, because the money originated in
their property, the resultant immoral act that is performed, or that could potentially be performed,
is also their property. If funding is the means to an end, whether it be directly through federal
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subsidizing or indirectly through healthcare, then to deny that funding avoids an assumption of
guilt for an undesirable end. The Supreme Court rulings in Beal v. Doe (1977), Harris v. McRae
(1980), Williams v. Zbaraz (1980), Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), and Little Sisters of the Poor
v. Pennsylvania (2020) demonstrate not only the institutionalization of the Religious Right belief
that abortion and “abortifacients” are immoral, but also that the state and its taxpaying citizens
are capable of being complicit in such an “immoral” act, an assumption of guilt that policies like
the Hyde Amendment and the RFRA are designed to prevent.

Complicity as a Snowball Effect, or the Slippery Slope Fallacy
Finally, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992), Burwell v.
Hobby Lobby (2014), Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) illustrate the expansion made by previous
cases of what kind of financial facilitation constitutes complicity in abortion and
“abortifacients,” as well as a snowball effect logic for who is capable of being complicit through
such financial facilitation and how.
The first component of a snowball effect logic of Religious Right complicity claims
concerns who is considered involved in the execution of an abortion or “abortifacient.” The
majority opinion in Casey (1992) makes this particularly clear in stating:
Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the woman
who must live with the implications of her decision; for the persons who perform and assist
in the procedure; for the spouse, family, and society which must confront the knowledge
that these procedures exist, procedures some deem nothing short of an act of violence
against innocent human life; and, depending on one's beliefs, for the life or potential life
that is aborted (Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,1992).
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What this statement suggests is a snowball effect of both who is involved with the abortion
decision, as well as who is affected by it. Meanwhile, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), the
Court acknowledged the snowball effect, but chose not to address it in full. Instead, the Court
wrote:
The Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage demanded by the HHS
regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make
it immoral for them to provide the coverage. This belief implicates a difficult and important
question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is
wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of
enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.[34] Arrogating the
authority to provide a binding national answer to this religious and philosophical question,
HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For
good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take such a step (Burwell v. Hobby Lobby,
2014).
Likewise, in Little Sisters of the Poor (2020), Justice Alito’s concurrence directly addresses the
snowball effect problem of where to draw the line of complicity, then chooses to not answer it.
Instead he says:
Where to draw the line in a chain of causation that leads to objectionable conduct is a
difficult moral question, and our cases have made it clear that courts cannot override the
sincere religious beliefs of an objecting party on that question (Little Sisters of the Poor
Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 2020).
What these three cases indicate is an enlargement of the circle of people involved in ending the
life or potential life of a fetus. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992),
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) broaden Religious Right rhetoric
of complicity not just in terms of who is capable of facilitating an abortion procedure or
“abortifacient” itself, but also who is capable of experiencing its presumed repercussions.
The second component of the snowball effect logic of Religious Right complicity claims
concerns how one becomes complicit, meaning, how their initial, individual action leads to a chain
of subsequent events that end with an “immoral” abortion procedure or “abortifacient” use.
However, in the case of Religious Right petitioners, there are little to no subsequent actions
between their financial facilitation and the termination of a fetus. Instead, their financial facilitation
is perceived as direct and active. Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) best exemplifies this snowball
logic, as the organization believed that “completing the certification form would force them to
violate their religious beliefs by ‘tak[ing] actions that directly [my emphasis] cause others to
provide contraception or appear to participate in the Departments’ delivery scheme’” (Little Sisters
of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 2020). To this claim the Court conceded,
proclaiming that:
If an employer has a religious objection to the use of a covered contraceptive, and if the
employer has a sincere religious belief that compliance with the mandate makes it complicit
in that conduct, then RFRA requires that the belief be honored (Little Sisters of the Poor
Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 2020).
Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) demonstrates the Religious Right’s assumption that providing
funds, whether through federal subsidies or employee health care plans, will directly lead to others
to having abortions or using “abortifacients;” there are no steps in between, nor are there alternative
endings to the chain of events. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992),
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014), Little Sisters of the Poor (2020) demonstrate Religious Right’s
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use of the term complicity to designate a slippery slope in a chain of actions that starts with their
financial facilitation, and culminates with the perceived immoral behavior of terminating a fetus.

VI.

Discussion: Why Religious Right Rhetorical Use of Complicity Fails
The Religious Right’s rhetorical use of the term complicity in abortion and contraceptive

care has been effective in the courtroom, but not without some inherent flaws. Based on my
working definition of complicity, Religious Right complicity claims fail on four grounds: on the
“evil” criterion; on the agency criterion; on the involvement criterion; and on the “reasonable
suspicion” criterion. The following section argues how Religious Right complicity claims fail on
each of these criteria respectively.

On the “Evil” Criterion
Drawing on the work of Dombrowski and Deltete (2000), I wish to problematize the first
criterion for complicity in Religious Right claims against abortion and contraceptives, which is
on the “evil” criterion. First, at least up until the second trimester, even if a fetus has a human
form, this is insufficient evidence to qualify it as a human person. Second, a fetus also has no
identity or claim to rights. Third, for these reasons, neither the fetus nor Religious Right
petitioners can claim victimhood from the act of abortion and contraceptive use. Finally, it is on
this philosophical and scientific understanding with which the reason of legality, and therefore
not “criminality,” of abortion and contraceptives operates.
The Religious Right views abortion and “abortifacients” as “evil,” and by extension
“criminal,” despite the Supreme Court having legalized their use through the right to privacy in
cases like Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) and, in a larger scope, Roe v. Wade (1973). As
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previously stated, although the law might reflect the dominant culture’s acceptance of abortion
and contraceptives, the morality of an act cannot rest solely on its legality. However, Religious
Right claims to abortion and contraceptives as being “evil” does not fail only because these acts
are legal in the U.S, but also because they rest on a scientifically and philosophically incorrect
assumption of both when human life begins and what constitutes potential human life.
According to Catholic scholars Deltete and Dombrowski, there are several reasons for
why abortion is not murder and therefore not immoral. First, they draw from Catholic thinking to
provide a philosophical argument for why a fetus is not a human person. Using the argument of
the prominent Catholic Saint Augustine, if having a human form is the basis for having human
life, “the question of homicide is not even pertinent with respect to the unformed fetus”
(Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, pp. 24, 27). Saint Augustine believed that not only is having a
human form necessary for being human, but so is sentiency necessary for having personhood.
Similarly, Catholic priest and philosopher Thomas Aquinas held that “whatever was growingin
the mother’s womb early in pregnancy was not yet a real human body; hence, it could not be
animated by a human soul any more than a square block of marble can already possess a human
shape” (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, p. 43). Aquinas also had a similar philosophy to
Augustine about the animation of the human soul. He believed that first, the fetus is “animated by
a vegetative or a nutritive soul (anima vegetabilis), then by a sensitive or an animalsoul (anima
sensitiva), finally by a rational or human soul (anima intellectiva)” (Dombrowski &Deltete,
2000, pp. 45-46). For both of these foundational Catholic thinkers, the fetus in its early stages is
not a human person because it does not have a human form, nor is it animated by a human soul.
As such, aborting a fetus in its early stages is not “evil” or “immoral.”
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Deltete and Dombrowski (2000) also give a scientific reasoning for why a fetus is not a
human person, and consequently why abortion is not murder, “evil,” or “criminal.” On the basis
of the common Religious Right claim that a fetus is human when it possesses a human form, this
does not occur at the “moment of conception.” Rather, it is not until around the third week of
pregnancy that essential DNA turns a zygote into an embryo. Only at this point during the third
week of pregnancy is a fetus physically existent in a human shape. However, they are not yet
capable of being animated or of having sensory emotions. In order for any life to have sensory
feelings, having a central nervous system is essential, but this does not form for the human fetus
until the end of the second trimester. As such, at least up until the end of the second trimester,
Deltete and Dombrowski (2000) claim, aborting a fetus is not immoral, murderous, “evil,” or
“criminal” because even if the fetus appears human, it is incapable of experiencing love, pain,
joy, or sadness due to its lack of neurological pathways.
Finally, Deltete and Dombrowski (2000) provide a philosophical argument for why
aborting a fetus cannot be considered “evil” by destroying a potential human life. For this, they
claim, human identity is based on individuals’ connection or “hinge”' to their past, not their
future (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, pp. 66-67). Our identities are shaped by a host of
experiences ranging from our childhoods, our friendships, our loss, and our pain. Thus, although
our human form remains somewhat constant (in the sense that we are the same physical body,
even if that body changes as we grow and develop), our identities are constantly shifting. A
zygote, an embryo, and a fetus do not have a human form or sensory perceptions, but they also
have no past with which to form an identity. Another reason why the potential human life claim
to abortion’s criminality fails is because “actual rights cannot be derived from any potential
qualifications for them” (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, p. 71). It would be strange if I, currentlya
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24 year-old at the writing of this project, began claiming a right to Medicare because I am
potentially going to be 65 years old one day. I do not currently know that I will live to be 65,
although I hope I do. Within the present moment, I cannot claim that right because whether or
not I reach 65 years-old to qualify is not guaranteed. In the same way, a fetus is still forming,
physically, mentally, emotionally, neurologically, and therefore does not yet have any right to
life (Dombrowski & Deltete, 2000, p. 77). Abortion is not “evil” on the grounds of destroying
potential human life because since a fetus has no past, nor does it have any claim to a future, it
also has no identity or rights.
Morality may sometimes be subjective or contextual, but the Religious Right’s rhetorical
use of complicity fails on the “evil” criterion. Until the end of the second trimester, a fetus might
appear human, but it has no central nervous system for sensory perception. Because a fetus has
no past, nor does it have a present, it has no identity or claim to future rights. As such, the fetus
does not suffer and does not constitute a victim, nor do the Religious Right petitioners. Finally,
due to these moral and scientific reasons, Roe v. Wade (1973) held abortion to be legal and
therefore not “criminal.” Abortion and contraceptives are thus not only federally legal, but they
are also legal because they are not absolutely immoral, thereby making the Court’s implicit
endorsement of the complicity argument on these grounds highly problematic.

On the Agency and Involvement Criteria
The second and third reasons why Religious Right rhetorical use of complicity is
incorrect is because it fails to meet the intertwined criterion of agency and involvement. In
simple terms, agency can be defined as the quality of being able to take action or to choose what
action to take (Agency, n.). The petitioners in question from these cases may be providing funds,
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but this does not constitute facilitation because they have little to no degree of agency over the
individuals with uteruses whose bodies they seek to regulate. As Sepinwall notes, because the
petitioner does not choose the conduct of the other person seeking an abortion or contraceptives,
they cannot be responsible for it (Sepinwall, 2015, p. 1916). She notes, “The real question here is
not whether an employee's decision belongs to, or is attributable to, her employer, but instead
whether the employer bears some responsibility for the employee's act even if the employers did
not participate in the decision to pursue that act” (Sepinwall, 2015, p. 1916). The answer to this
question is a resounding “no.” Employers and taxpayers play no role in an individual’s decision
to use contraceptives or have an abortion. It would be quite strange for an individual to ask their
boss or a random stranger on the street for permission to receive reproductive care. Petitioners do
not even have proxy agency in these situations because they have no authority to act on the
behalf of the individual seeking an abortion and contraceptive access. Abortion and
contraceptive use have no implication on the general public because the decision rests primarily,
and often solely, between the individual and their healthcare provider.
To reiterate the Lockean framework of complicity, funds for abortions and contraceptives
may originate in the hands of taxpayers and employers, but once the money leaves their hands, it
is no longer their property (Locke, 2003, p. 191). By extension, how that funding is used is also
no longer their property. It would be odd if I received my paycheck from work, bought a car with
those funds, and then my boss declared that my car was theirs because the money that was used
to pay for it originated in their property. In the same way, once funding leaves taxpayers’ and
employers’ hands, what happens with that money is no longer their property because they do not
have any agency to decide how those funds should be used, if they are to be used at all. Any
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subsequent act that is performed, or that could potentially be performed, is not their property,
because that choice rests exclusively between the individual and their healthcare provider.
This connects to the next complicity criterion that is closely related to agency, which is
the concept of involvement, yet a third criterion for complicity that Religious Right complicity
claims fail to meet. The Religious Right’s low degree of agency in abortion and contraceptive
services also means that they have low involvement. After paying their taxes or providing the
healthcare option, petitioners end their involvement in any abortion decision. Those funds are no
longer their “property,” and therefore how they are used is not their responsibility. Likewise,
they do not go to the healthcare provider with the patient, nor do they put the birth control pills in
their mouth. Again, it would be odd for an individual to ask their boss or a stranger to go to the
healthcare facility with them for an abortion or contraceptives. Members of the Religious Right
are thus not involved in making the decision, nor are they involved in the execution of that
decision.
That being said, while in reality the Religious Right does not have agency or involvement
in others’ abortion and contraceptive use, they have successfully turned to the Supreme Court in
order to use their state authority and access greater power and exert a larger degree of agency
over people with uteruses. This is what Sepinwall calls intentional participation by the Religious
Right and the general public in abortion and contraceptive use (Sepinwall 2015, p. 1913).
Petitioners do not have to be involved in abortion and contraceptive services, but they have
chosen to involve themselves, a power that the Supreme Court has unhesitatingly granted them.
In weighing the U.S. Constitution’s promise of separation of church and state against the
freedom of religious exercise, the Supreme Court has overwhelmingly favored the latter. In
doing so, the boundary of public versus private is blurred, making the very private matter of
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reproductive care public, and, as a result, people with uteruses are deprived of autonomous selfgovernment over their bodies. It is clear that Religious Right rhetorical claims to complicity are
based on a false assumption that reproductive care is a public matter that grants them agency and
involvement in others’ reproductive care decisions.
The fact that the Religious Right believe that it is within their authority, their duty even,
to leverage state power over the reproductive female bodies illustrates what scholar Susan Bordo
calls the construction of fetuses as “supersubjects” and people with uteruses as mere “fetal
incubators” (Bordo, 1993, p. 72). Rather than emphasizing the suffering imposed on living,
breathing, conscious people with uteruses that is caused by the stripping of the reproductive
agency and autonomy, Religious Right complicity claims emphasize the suffering imposed on a
non-living, non-breathing, non-conscious fetus. As Bordo writes in her work Unbearable
Weight, the U.S. legal tradition “divides the human world as Descartes divided all of reality: into
conscious subjects and mere bodies (rex extensa) (Bordo, 1993, p. 73). By harnessing state legal
power, the Religious Right elevates the personhood status of the fetus at the expense of the
pregnant individual’s personhood. The people with uteruses are no longer embodied subjects, but
are simply disembodied subjects, whose believed obligation is to sacrifice their personhood for
the fulfillment of another’s (Bordo, 1993, p. 79). Thus, although the Religious Right does not
have true agency and involvement in others’ reproductive care decisions, they have selectively
used the legal system to secure state power and make their agency and involvement a perceived
reality, but they do so on behalf of the false personhood ofthe fetus at the expense of the pregnant
person’s.

On the “Reasonable Suspicion” Criterion
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The final reason why Religious Right complicity claims fail is because their claim to
“financial facilitation” does not meet the “reasonable suspicion” criterion. In regard to federal
funding, healthcare, and other social programs to promote access to reproductive care, petitioners
immediately jump to the conclusion that people are using these funds for abortions and
contraceptives. In reality, petitioners’ low agency and involvement means little reasonable
suspicion. Even the term suspicion is inappropriate, because it paints abortion and contraceptive
use as “evil,” which was disproved in a previous section of this research, and not as essential
healthcare for citizens’ well-being. This again points to the idea of complicity as a snowball or
slippery slope effect, but in regard to abortion and contraceptives, it is a fallacy.
Take the argument presented in Hobby Lobby (2014), for instance. In this case, the
petitioners start with the premise that the Contraceptive Mandate of the Affordable Care Act
requires employers to provide a healthcare plan that covers contraceptives without cost-sharing.
This is a true statement. This initial premise is followed by a second premise, which is that
abortion falls under contraceptive care. Under the language of the Contraceptive Mandate, this is
a true statement. However, these two premises are followed by the false conclusion that the
Contraceptive Mandate means that any healthcare plan that covers contraceptives is going to be
used only for abortions or “abortifacients,” and only for the purposes of ending pregnancies. A
similar fallacy forms the basis for policies like the Hyde Amendment, with the initial premises
being that if federal funds go toward public health programs and facilities, and that program or
facility includes abortion services (such as Planned Parenthood), then everyone will seek only
abortion services from those programs or facilities only to end pregnancies.
Following this slippery slope logic, Religious Right complicity claims fail the
“reasonable suspicion” criterion on three counts. The first is that because taxpayers and

Rahn, “Funding Abortion as Facilitating It”
June 11, 2021

42

employers have no agency or involvement in others’ reproductive care, they have no way of
knowing whether citizens or employees are getting abortions or “abortifacients” or not.
Employers could provide a healthcare plan that covers abortion and contraceptives, but they have
no way of knowing how many of their employees are using that insurance coverage, if any. As
such, individuals who claim complicity due to their financial facilitation are disproven because
there is no “reasonable suspicion” that those funds are even being used.
The second count on which the “reasonable suspicion” criterion is not met in Religious
Right complicity claims is that taxpayers and employers have no reasonable suspicion why an
individual might be using contraceptives or seeking an abortion, if they are. As mentioned in the
introduction to this paper, there are many uses for contraceptives outside of ending pregnancy,
including regulating menstruation, preventing ovarian and uterine cancers, treating
endometriosis, and treating gender dysphoria. An individual might be seeking an abortion
because pregnancy is a threat to their physical health, or they are not in a financially stable
position to raise a child once it is born. Because of their low agency and involvement in an
individual’s reproductive care, a stranger or an employer cannot possibly know why that
individual is seeking that care.
The third and final count for “reasonable suspicion” that Religious Right complicity
claims fail to meet is that even if federal funding or a healthcare plan for reproductive care are
being used, taxpayers and employers have no way of knowing that they are being used
specifically for abortion and contraceptives. For instance, in regard to the Hyde Amendment and
Planned Parenthood, Planned Parenthood does perform abortions and provide birth control, but
these are not their only services. Planned Parenthood also provides general health care; HIV
services; gender-affirming treatment like hormone therapy; STD testing, treatment, and
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vaccinations; fertility testing; pregnancy testing; cancer screenings; sexual dysfunction
treatment; and sexual education (Our Services). Taxpayers and employers cannot consider
themselves to be complicit in financially facilitating abortion and contraceptives because that is
not necessarily what their finances are going toward.
Because Religious Right complicity claimants have a low degree of agency and
involvement in others’ reproductive decisions, they also do not have any “reasonable suspicion”if
their finances are being used, why they are being used, or how they are being used.

VII.

Conclusions
The current COVID-19 pandemic is not our only public health crisis; so, too, is the U.S.’s

failure to protect access to reproductive care for its 166.7 million people with uteruses (Ranking
By Population (Female) All Countries in North America.) As this project exposes, the public
health emergency of reproductive care is no accident: It is the result of a pattern of gendered
regulation and neglect by our nation’s political institutions through their implicit acceptance of
Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims. Our society does not view people with uteruses as
autonomous beings, but rather as disembodied subjects requiring parental-like supervision by
both the state and the general public. This is especially true when females engage, or at least are
perceived to engage, in non-monogamous, non-marital, and/or non-procreative sexual behaviors.
Religious Right anti-choice claims are based on the belief that through taxes and
healthcare, states and citizens are financially facilitating abortions, and thereby participating in
the evil, criminal act of killing a fetus. Their financial facilitation is perceived as the first in a
chain of events that directly leads to destroying a human life, or a potential human life. There are
no intermediary steps, nor are there alternative endings. The Supreme Court’s acceptance of anti-
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choice complicity claims institutionalizes the belief that abortion and contraceptives are immoral
acts, and gives citizens state agency, authority, and power to influence reproductive care
outcomes on behalf of the false personhood of a fetus. In doing so, people with uteruses are
reduced to disembodied subjects whose personhood is subordinated for the fulfillment of
another’s.
This study lays the foundation for how U.S. legal institutions might create boundaries
around complicity to better evaluate Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims and balance
freedoms to religious exercise and reproductive care. This includes the criteria of “evil,” agency,
involvement, and “reasonable suspicion,” which I have demonstrated Religious Right anti-choice
complicity claims to fail on all four counts. However, more research is necessary to determine
exactly what the legal boundaries of complicity should be. This will become increasingly
apparent as more and more Religious Right anti-choice complicity claims are brought before the
Supreme Court, particularly in the wake of Hobby Lobby (2014) and Little Sisters of the Poor
(2020). The state control of female reproduction is full of moral, biological, legal, and political
conflicts and contradictions that need to continue to be addressed because every body, my own
included, has a stake.
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